Docket – February 6, 2019

4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals

Curtis v. Propel Prop. Tax Funding LLC (P), 4th Cir. (Duncan) from EDVA at Richmond (Gibney).

Upon interlocutory review, the plaintiff has standing to bring claims under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act because the harm that he alleges – being require to pre-authorize EFTs as a condition of a credit transaction – is a substantive statutory violation that subjects him to the very risks that the EFT Act, a consumer protection statute, was designed to protect against.

In addition, the parties’ “tax payment agreement” is subject to the EFT Act and the Truth in Lending Act because it is represents a consumer credit transaction. The agreement is a credit transaction because it provides for third-party financing of a tax obligation. It is a consumer transaction because, as financing of a real property tax debt, it is a voluntary transaction that the plaintiff entered into for personal or household purposes.

Affirmed. Judge Keenan wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

United States v. Charboneau (P), 4th Cir. (Quattlebaum) from EDNC at Raleigh (Dever).

The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 doesn’t require a “sexually dangerous person” to be diagnosed with a paraphilia disorder in order to justify civil commitment for a serious mental illness. Here, the record amply supports the district’s court’s designation of the appellant as a “sexually dangerous person.”

Although the appellant behaved in an exemplary fashion while in prison, upon his release he abused alcohol and re-offended violently and sexually. The district court considered the appellant’s expert testimony and found it less credible than other testimony.

Affirmed.

Virginia Circuit Courts

Commonwealth v. Belete, Fairfax (Gardiner).

Code s. 19.2-182.5 does not violate the Due Process Clause as applied to the committed defendant, who on early charges of felony larceny was found not guilty by reason of insanity.

Here, the acquittee was previously committed for four years and then conditionally released to outpatient treatment. After violating the conditions of his release, he was recommitted in 2018. The current state of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is that, to satisfy due process demands, continued commitment of an acquittee requires both a showing of mental illness and a showing of future dangerousness. Section 19.2-182.5 entails such an analysis, requiring the court to assess among other things “the likelihood that the acquittee will engage in conduct presenting a substantial risk of bodily harm to other persons or to himself in the foreseeable future.

Further, the Commonwealth met its burden to show future dangerousness. Two clinical psychologists recommended continued hospitalization based on the acquittee’s admitted relapse into the use of illegal drugs. He has also had inconsistent adherence to his prescription regimen and has stopped attending program therapy sessions.

Motion to strike denied.



Categories: Daily Dockets

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